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A CLOSE READING OF BARNETTE,
IN HONOR OF VINCENT BLASI
Paul Horwitz*
I am aware that we must decide the case before us and not
some other case. But that does not mean that a case is
dissociated from the past and unrelated to the future.1
—Justice Felix Frankfurter
I.

INTRODUCTION

Because he spent years teaching at both Columbia and the University of
Virginia (after stints at Texas and Michigan), Vincent Blasi has been
influential, as a colleague or teacher, for many contemporary First
Amendment scholars. Although all of us have learned from his first-rate body
of writing on the First Amendment, his influence as a teacher has been no
less profound. I was fortunate enough to take one of his First Amendment
classes as an LL.M. candidate at Columbia in 1996-97, and I have tried to
pay back my debt to him, and benefit my own students, by “borrowing”—or,
more plainly, stealing—some of his teaching techniques ever since.
Perhaps the central element of his teaching that every student of Blasi’s
remembers, and that many of us have adopted in our own classes, is his
assignment of what he calls “critiques” or “close readings.”2 In the close
reading assignment, students are asked to select a case or some other discrete
text3 and offer a careful, thorough treatment of the case. It is not a research
paper. The goal is to get the most out of the opinions in that case, not to dig
*
Gordon Rosen Professor, Hugh F. Culverhouse Jr. School of Law, University of Alabama; Visiting
Scholar, Center for the Study of Law and Religion, Emory Law School, Spring 2019.
1

W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 660 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).

The teacher’s manual to the first edition of Blasi’s Ideas of the First Amendment casebook refers
to them as “critiques,” but I remember him as having called them close readings, and that is what I call
them when assigning them to my students.
2

3 Blasi also uses the assignment in his Ideas of the First Amendment course, in which the readings
include classics like Milton’s Areopagitica and Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance. In my own Law
and Religion class, I give students a list of cases and a number of texts, including the Memorial and
Remonstrance, one or two classic early American political sermons such as Elisha Williams’s The
Essential Rights and Liberties of Protestants, and a few timely or essential law review articles. I usually
include some of my own work, not in the hope of receiving praise but because, after poking around in my
students’ minds, I believe they are entitled to reciprocity. Students are assigned two close readings over
the course of the semester and at least one must center on a case rather than some other text.
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through the First Amendment caselaw or secondary literature. Nor is it a lineby-line analysis or exercise in doctrinal skill. It is an exercise in selectiveness.
The student may choose a single theme, drawing on all the opinions in that
case to develop and critique that theme. Or she may focus on a single opinion,
or even a section, paragraph, or sentence in that opinion, exploring the
meaning of that portion of the opinion: its unspoken premises, its logic, its
promise, and its flaws. The goal is to achieve a genuine intellectual
experience, a fresh encounter between a text and its reader, one that
constitutes an original and genuine expression rather than an imitation or the
kind of third-person summary of masses of doctrine that characterizes law
school exams.
To this I would add two other features that make the close reading a
valuable form of writing for students and scholars alike. The first Blasi
himself emphasized in talking to his students, as best as I can remember, and
the second he exemplifies in his own work.
First, there is the sad fact that the reading of complete judicial opinions
is relatively infrequent in American legal education. The casebook is the
primary vehicle for legal education in this country. Far from its Langdellian
origins, which focused on “largely unedited, appellate opinions,”4 many
casebooks feature a vast selection of miniscule case excerpts. Landgell
wanted students to have “direct, unlimited, and continuous access” to cases.5
Over time, however, casebook editors took to “heavily edit[ing]”6 the cases
that appear within them, for many reasons: to make room for questions,
commentary, and non-case “materials”; to keep up with the proliferation of
caselaw; to provide teachers with options for what to teach or omit; to keep
the casebook from becoming too long (not a successful project, on the
whole); and so on. Although I suspect this is less true today, the heavy
redaction of judicial opinions has been used as a selling point, according to
which cases are “‘heavily enough edited’ that students ‘are not forced to
struggle through unnecessary detail and discussion before reaching the point
of the case.’”7 In “doing more and more editorial work,” “whittl[ing]” cases

4 Kate O’Neill, But Who Will Teach Legal Reasoning and Synthesis?, 4 J. ASS’N LEGAL WRITING
DIRECTORS 21, 29 (2007); see also Stephen M. Johnson, The Course Source: The Casebook Evolved, 44
CAP. U. L. REV. 591, 618 (2016) (noting that the first edition of Langdell’s casebook on contract law “was
a thousand-page collection of cases, mostly unedited, with a topical index and no commentary other than
a three-page preface”).
5 Matthew Bodie, The Future of the Casebook: An Argument for an Open-Source Approach, 57 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 10, 12 (2007).
6

Johnson, supra note 4, at 620.

E. Allan Farnsworth, Casebooks and Scholarship: Confessions of an American Opinion Clipper,
42 SW. U. L. REV. 903, 906 (1988) (quoting a circular letter sent to law professors by the author of a
contract law casebook).
7
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“down into snippets” while expanding “the space devoted to explaining what
the cases stand for,” the casebook editor taking this approach produces a
product that is “easier and easier for the students to read and digest”; but in
doing so, she is “in fact doing less and less for the teaching process.”8
Based on my occasional surveys of new casebooks, I think this trend
peaked some time ago, and that more casebook editors are attempting to
include longer versions of cases. But that is a relative measure. Through most
of their educations, with the exception of legal writing classes, a few unusual
teachers or courses, and perhaps work on longer papers, law students still
spend most of their time with heavily edited cases.
Thus, to speak to the case at hand, a student using a recent edition of the
popular Gerald Gunther-descended constitutional law casebook would
encounter a page-and-a-half excerpt from West Virginia Board of Education
v. Barnette.9 The student gets a taste of Barnette, including the classic “fixed
star in our constitutional constellation” passage and, perhaps for color and
with some critical intent, a portion of Justice Frankfurter’s dissent identifying
himself with “the most vilified and persecuted minority in history.” What the
student will not get is the wealth and richness of the entire case—the facts
and their use, the multiple observations and apothegms of Justice Jackson,
the rich doctrinal and jurisprudential dissent of Justice Frankfurter, which
involves much more than an impassioned personal statement, and the
multiple conflicting ideas offered in the concurrences of Justices Black and
Murphy.10
A second element of legal education that makes the close reading a
useful exercise is the nature of student evaluation in legal education. Again,
my anecdotal sense is that things are improving. But the issue-spotting

8 Anthony D’Amato, The Decline and Fall of Law Teaching in the Age of Student Consumerism,
37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 461, 485–86 (1987). The date of the article suggests that complaints about
consumerism in legal education began long before so-called Millennials entered the law classroom.
9 319 U.S. 624 (1943). See KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & NOAH FELDMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
1321–23 (18th ed., 2013); id. at 1497–98 (repeating, in a chapter on the Religion Clauses, a portion of the
same excerpt used previously in a chapter on free speech). In the (wonderful) casebook I use in teaching
law and religion, Barnette fares somewhat better, getting just under three and a half somewhat denser
pages. See MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL, THOMAS C. BERG & CHRISTOPHER C. LUND, RELIGION AND THE
CONSTITUTION 458–61 (4th ed. 2016).
10 I regret that I do not examine those opinions here. They certainly deserve the attention. Among
other things, in keeping with the “pre-capitulation” theme that I pursue below, the concurring and
dissenting opinions offer a remarkably full advance version of the arguments that have occupied Free
Exercise Clause law over the past 75 years. And Justice Frankfurter’s dissent, whether one agrees with it
or not, has faced decades of undeserved neglect. That may be changing. See, e.g., Samuel Moyn, Human
Rights and Majority Politics: On Felix Frankfurter’s Democratic Theory (Jan. 20, 2019) (available at
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3319515).
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exam—often a single final exam that, absurdly,11 comprises one’s whole
grade in a course—is still an American law school mainstay. The goal of such
exams is to integrate a large body of doctrine and cases. The exam answer
should include some nuance and detail, but is fundamentally synoptic.
Students focus on aggregating multiple cases (more accurately, case
excerpts) rather than engaging closely with a single case. Student notes
sometimes focus on a single case, but more often focus on a single legal issue
while drawing on multiple cases. In short, there are few opportunities in legal
education to engage closely with the full version of a single judicial decision,
let alone to engage with it as a more or less self-contained text.
This is not Blasi’s way. That is evident not only in his teaching, but in
his own, extraordinary scholarship. Much of that work consists not of
doctrine-chopping and the manipulation of multiple cases,12 but of rich
examinations of individual thinkers (both judges and others) and, often,
single pieces of writing by those thinkers. Over the years, they have included
close readings of Milton’s Areopagitica,13 Justice Brandeis’s concurring
opinion in Whitney v. California,14 Justice Holmes’s dissent in Abrams v.
United States15 and its classic reference to the marketplace of ideas,16 and
Learned Hand’s opinion in Masses.17 In one lecture, he moved to a microlevel, examining passages by Holmes and John Stuart Mill.18 Nor has he
neglected Barnette, having co-written a penetrating chapter on that case with
Seana Shiffrin.19
To pay tribute to Blasi by offering my own “close reading” is, I hope,
fitting. To do so by writing on a case to which he (and, of course, his co11 See, e.g., Nancy B. Rapoport, Is “Thinking Like a Lawyer” Really What We Want to Teach?, 1
J. ASS’N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 91, 97, 102 (2002).
12 Although he has made important contributions to the First Amendment literature that fall more
into this category. See, e.g., Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 521; Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 COLUM.
L. REV. 449 (1985); Vincent Blasi, Free Speech and Good Character, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1567 (1998).
13 See Vincent Blasi, John Milton’s Areopagitica and the Modern First Amendment, 13 COMM.
LAW. 1 (1995).
14 274 U.S. 357 (1927). See Vincent Blasi, The First Amendment and the Ideal of Civic Courage:
The Brandeis Opinion in Whitney v. California, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 653 (1988).
15

250 U.S. 616 (1919).

16

See Vincent Blasi, Holmes and the Marketplace of Ideas, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 1 (2004).

Vincent Blasi, Learned Hand and the Self-Government Theory of the First Amendment: Masses
Publ’g Co. v. Patten, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 1 (1990) (discussing Masses Publ’g Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535
(S.D.N.Y. 1917)).
17

18 See Vincent Blasi, Shouting Fire in a Theater and Vilifying Corn Dealers, 39 CAP. U. L. REV.
535 (2011).
19 See Vincent Blasi & Seana V. Shiffrin, The Story of West Virginia State Board of Education v.
Barnette: The Pledge of Allegiance and the Freedom of Thought, in FIRST AMENDMENT STORIES 99
(Richard W. Garnett & Andrew Koppelman eds., 2012).
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author, Shiffrin, as well) has already brought a keen eye is, perhaps,
foolhardy.20 That’s especially true because in some respects what follows
departs from the model of a close reading I have described above.
For the most part, and despite the usual array of footnotes that have
attached themselves like barnacles to this article, I have avoided the
secondary literature on Barnette, instead focusing on my own reading of the
case. I also avoid slotting Barnette into a larger doctrinal framework. I have
something to say about what arguably followed from Barnette, but the
primary focus of this reading is still the text of Barnette itself.
Unlike the usual approach of a classic Blasi close reading, however, this
article does not follow a single theme or focus on a single passage. Indeed,
the most famous passage from Barnette—Justice Jackson’s “fixed star”
statement about the impermissibility of government orthodoxy, which has
been called one of the “dozen or so most quoted and revered passages to
appear in a Supreme Court opinion”21—has already been subjected to this
kind of analysis so often that I mostly omit it here.22
Instead, I offer a gallery of passages from Justice Jackson’s opinion in
Barnette. Each of them has been given far less attention by First Amendment
scholars, and each could easily support a close reading of its own. These
passages are worth exploring both in themselves and for the light they shed
on the whole opinion in Barnette. Beyond that, however, these passages also
shed light on how First Amendment doctrine itself has developed over the
past 75 years. If this is not quite the kind of exercise that Professor Blasi asks
his students to undertake, it at least serves as notice that one student—
standing in for many, I’m sure—has not forgotten Blasi’s emphasis on the
importance of delving into the entirety of a judicial opinion.
Before exploring the passages I wish to highlight, allow me to offer a
couple of general framing remarks. The first takes stock of Barnette in its
75th anniversary year. On the one hand, Barnette’s stock is high. It had a
good year. It was cited by the majority, not trivially but significantly, in two

20 Perhaps doubly foolhardy, for a reason I could have foregone sharing but feel compelled and
slightly delighted to reveal. While I did well in Blasi’s class, my wife, Kelly Riordan Horwitz, was a
student in one of his First Amendment courses and wrote a close reading that he still remembered and
handed out as an exemplary close reading years later, long after he had forgotten my own contribution.
Unfortunately, she was not invited to contribute to this symposium, and so he will have to make do with
this tribute from a lesser author.
21

Steven D. Smith, Barnette’s Big Blunder, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 625, 625 (2003).

See, e.g., id.; Andrew Koppelman, No Expressly Religious Orthodoxy: A Response to Steven D.
Smith, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 729 (2003); Abner Greene, The Pledge of Allegiance Problem, 64 FORDHAM
L. REV. 451 (1995).
22
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major decisions last Term—Masterpiece Cakeshop23 and Janus24—and again
significantly in a dissent in the crisis pregnancy center case, Becarra.25
Other recent evidence, however, suggests that it is in poorer health than
these examples indicate, at least in academic circles. One might, for instance,
expect discussion of Barnette, if only to distinguish it, in scholarly treatments
of hot-button cases like Masterpiece Cakeshop, Elane Photography,26 or
Arlene’s Flowers.27 One can find plenty of articles discussing these cases.
Some 61 law review articles cite all three, while 78 cite the latter two, and
nearly 165 cite Masterpiece and at least one of the other two cases. If one
adds “Barnette” to the search terms, however, the numbers plummet to 15,
18, and 33 articles, respectively.28
Of course, one can distinguish Barnette from the wedding-vendor cases.
Lawyers can almost always distinguish precedents. What is interesting is not
whether scholars believe that it is distinguishable or not, but that many of
them skip the question altogether. It is simply absent from much of the
discussion. I doubt this is because the case has been forgotten or treated as
irrelevant. It could suggest that a larger number of scholars think of Barnette
as antiquated or passé despite its apparent vitality in the courts. But I think a
more likely explanation is that a growing number of scholars are
uncomfortable with Barnette. They are uneasy about how it fits into modern
legal doctrine and substantive debates and what it suggests about current
fashionable positions. This is speculation on my part, to be clear. As we will
see, however, it is relevant to the conclusions I draw from a close reading of
Barnette.
The second general observation concerns Barnette’s relationship to the
development of First Amendment law over the 75 years. Barnette is
important to modern First Amendment law in two ways. The first is so
generally accepted that it requires little comment. I doubt any citation is
necessary for the proposition that Barnette is one of the key opinions in the
canon of First Amendment law.29
23

See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rts. Com’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1731 (2018).

24

See Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2463 (2018).

See Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2387 (2018) (Breyer,
J., dissenting).
25
26

See Elane Photography, L.L.C. v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013).

27

See State v. Arlene’s Flowers, 187 Wash. 2d 804 (2017).

The numbers in this paragraph are based on searches of the Westlaw Law Reviews & Journals
database. In keeping with the anniversary year theme and to control for later discussions offering rote
citations to Barnette because of its appearance in the Supreme Court’s decision in Masterpiece Cakeshop,
I limited the date field to articles published before January 1, 2019.
28

29 Here are a couple anyway. See, e.g., Timothy Zick, Managing Dissent, 95 WASH. U. L. REV.
1423, 1451 (2018) (calling Barnette “part of the First Amendment canon” and “an iconic affirmation of a
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The second point is less often observed, although it is probably true of
many canonical constitutional cases. In both freedom of speech and freedom
of religion, Barnette not only serves as the fount for what would follow, but
offers a fascinating predictive summary—what I call a pre-capitulation30—
of the development of legal doctrine in these areas over the subsequent 75
years. Some of this will be evident in the discussion of aspects of Justice
Jackson’s opinion below. Even more of it can be found in the concurring and
dissenting opinions in the case, which unfortunately are omitted from this
discussion. Between them, the four opinions in Barnette read like a syllabus
of the major issues in First Amendment law between 1943 and 2018. I
suggest that there are two related reasons for this, both of which should be of
interest to students of Barnette and other canonical cases and to
constitutionalists more generally.
The first reason has to do with the particular mode of greatness of Justice
Jackson’s opinion in Barnette. Paraphrasing Richard Posner’s description of
Justice Holmes’s dissent in Lochner,31 we can say of Jackson’s opinion in
Barnette that it is “not . . . a good judicial opinion. It is merely [one of] the
greatest judicial opinion[s] of the last hundred years.”32 The Barnette opinion
is not great because it is tightly organized, exhaustive and careful in its use
of existing precedents, carefully aimed at and confined to the facts, or clear
and precise in the doctrinal rule it announces. It decides the case, but it does
very little by way of practical doctrinal development. Beyond the particular
context, it offers very little by way of judicially clear and manageable
standards for lower courts in the area of what came to be labeled as
“compelled speech.”33
Rather, the opinion is great because it is rich, fascinating, eloquent,
sweeping, and powerful. It lacks the brevity of Holmes’s Lochner dissent,
which “focuses and commands the reader’s attention” and “gives the opinion
core right to dissent with respect to and resist majoritarian ideas regarding politics, patriotism, and
nationalism”); Steven G. Calabresi, On Liberty, Equality, and the Constitution: A Review of Richard A.
Epstein’s The Classical Liberal Constitution, 8 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 839, 925 (2014) (writing,
somewhat awkwardly, that with Barnette “the New Deal Supreme Court . . . issued one [of] its most
important liberty protective opinions of all time”).
30 In keeping with the current and unfortunate vogue in legal scholarship for novelty by neologism
or by clever labeling or branding, I am pleased to note that “pre-capitulation” cannot be found anywhere
else in the law review databases. As with many other ostensibly novel ideas or labels, that is hardly any
guarantee that the concept itself is unknown or unused. Many well-placed articles these days achieve the
appearance of novelty by slapping new labels on old ideas.
31

Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).

32

RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE 346 (3d ed. 2009).

One might contrast Barnette with Eugene Volokh’s recent helpful, detailed, and distinctly
doctrinalist treatment of that subject. See Eugene Volokh, The Law of Compelled Speech, 97 TEX. L. REV.
355 (2018).
33
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a power it would lack if it were longer and more diffuse, burying the
aphorisms under qualifications, citations, quotations, legal jargon, numbing
factual detail, and the other common padding of judicial opinions.”34 But like
that dissent, it is rich with aphoristic eloquence and short on technical jargon
and detail. Indeed, despite its relative length, in legal and public memory it
has been reduced to a just a few ringing passages—especially the “fixed star”
passage. It is not great because these passages are clear or clearly right, but
because they feel clearly right. Like other great texts in the literature of
American civil religion, they are suggestive, inspirational, intuitively
persuasive, and fertile. Like those other texts, if read either literally and
mechanically or deeply and for all it is worth, the opinion raises countless
questions, dilemmas, contradictions, and practical problems. These make it
difficult or impossible to adhere completely to it. But it compels our attention
and commands our loyalties far more than an opinion that met all the standard
desiderata such as clarity or guidance would.
It is not clear whether “such a style remains possible in a mature legal
system.”35 That’s not necessarily a bad thing. We may desire other qualities
from judicial opinions—things like clear and easily applicable rules,
certainty, reliability, clarity, and finality—even if we sacrifice eloquence or
suggestiveness.36 And although great opinions like Barnette have tremendous
staying power, we may be aware that most judges, let alone their law clerks,
are not great poets or deathless writers, and that most attempts at judicial
poetry will fail miserably. We may thus prefer workmanlike prose from
judges who do not aspire to be great writers to the wooden, treacly, vain,
pompous, or painful failures that generally result when they do.
Nevertheless, we lose something when our opinions become highly
mechanical or technical. And having become accustomed to the modern
style, we may miss something when we read the older, grander, but less
technically formal opinions in the modern fashion. We may focus on
individual words or technical formulae at the expense of the general sense
and sensibility of a great opinion. In examining some of the passages in the
Barnette opinion below, I will suggest that while some of the questions it
raises about current doctrine can be addressed by reading its words narrowly,
focusing on it only as a case in the ostensible category of compelled speech,
or otherwise distinguishing it, doing so risks “captur[ing] some of the lyrics”
of the opinion while remaining deaf to its “music.”37 Great opinions demand
34

POSNER, supra note 32, at 345.

35

Id. at 351 (discussing the “magisterial style” of Chief Justice John Marshall).

36

See generally Frederick Schauer, Opinions as Rules, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1455 (1995).

Paul Horwitz, Demographics and Distrust: The Eleventh Circuit on Graduation Prayer in Adler
v. Duval County, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 835, 855 (2009).
37
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more from their readers than a technical reading of individual words; they
require us to recapture a sense of the full music and meaning of those
opinions. A lawyer reading the words of the Beatles’ I Want to Hold Your
Hand might suggest that the song is limited to the narrow category of handholding.38 A more thoughtful listener might conclude that the singer also
wants to kiss the girl.
“Great” opinions like Jackson’s in Barnette are more common in the
early stages of legal doctrine, when the law is “fresh” and the writer lacks
“the modern judge’s burden of negotiating a minefield of authoritative
precedents.”39 Given the scarcity of doctrine on the ground, such opinions are
almost literally “landmark” opinions: They provide a grand edifice around
which everything else—all the functional, mundane, and necessary buildings
and infrastructure of ordinary life—is built. They may remain visible and oftvisited monuments, or they may become empty shells, overshadowed and
obscured by the city that grows around, and perhaps over, them. But they are
essential to all the development that follows.
This leads to the second reason why the opinions in Barnette offer a
prescient “pre-capitulation” of subsequent First Amendment doctrine. To be
“great” in the sense we call Jackson’s opinion great is precisely to offer a
grand, eloquent, seemingly final statement that ultimately raises more
questions than it settles. It is to offer a vital legal, political, and cultural
statement that then requires decades of implementation, qualification,
exceptions, and other ways of making that statement practically useful,
acceptable, and livable.
This can be put in positive or critical ways. Charles Fried has written
positively of the ways in which “the great organizing doctrines of
constitutional law have come into being.” Some of those doctrines “issue
from early and sweeping decisions[,] . . . with the whole course of later
jurisprudence working out the implications instinct in their large
generalizations.” Others emerge “through an accumulation of distinctions,
accretions, and expansions.”40 Although he describes the former approach as
encompassing doctrines concerning judicial review and the relationship
between state and federal courts and the latter as characteristic of free speech
doctrine, Barnette arguably comports with both descriptions.
More critically, writers on jurisdiction in federal courts have described
the ways in which initially clear statements can be “fuzz[y] at the margin,” a
fuzziness that “often becomes magnified by judicial interpretation” and

38

THE BEATLES, I WANT TO HOLD YOUR HAND (EMI Studios 1964).

39

POSNER, supra note 32, at 351.

40

Charles Fried, Constitutional Doctrine, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1140, 1152–53 (1994).
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implementation.41 The result of seemingly clear judicial statements that
“misstate [their] own firmness,” Frederic Bloom argues, is the “need for
offsetting measures, elaborate escape valves devised to soften jurisdiction’s
hard rules.”42 Similarly, I have suggested that some of First Amendment
doctrine’s seemingly clear rules are fitted over time with “safety valves” that
take some of the pressure off those rules and allow for sound and reasonable
results in individual cases, thus weakening those doctrines but enabling them
to stay in existence longer.43
Sometimes, the kinds of questions that require modifications and
changes in doctrine arise only over time and with experience. But despite the
strength and assurance of Barnette’s majority opinion, many of the questions
it raised were surely obvious from the start, were at least implicit in Jackson’s
opinion, and were acknowledged more openly in the concurring and
dissenting opinions. Some of them will be apparent in the discussion that
follows. Between them, one can appreciate the surprising degree to which the
opinions in Barnette represent a canvassing avant la lettre of modern First
Amendment doctrine.
To see this, however, we must first tour the gallery of passages that are
the focus of this close reading. In each case, I begin with the passage, and
then offer some remarks on it.
II. READING BARNETTE
The resolution [of the Board of Education] originally
required the “commonly accepted salute to the Flag” which
41

Scott Dodson, The Complexity of Jurisdictional Clarity, 97 VA. L. REV. 1, 5 (2011).

Frederic M. Bloom, Jurisdiction’s Noble Lie, 61 STAN. L. REV. 971, 973 (2009) (quotation and
citation omitted).
42

43 PAUL HORWITZ, FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTIONS 34, 37 (2013). For similar observations,
with respect to particular doctrines or First Amendment law more generally, see, e.g., First Amendment—
Freedom of Speech—Government Speech—Walker v. Texas Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 129
HARV. L. REV. 221, 221 (2015) (describing government speech doctrine as a “constitutional escape hatch”
that allows government to speak without having to confront all the strictures of ordinary free speech
doctrine); Patricia R. Stembridge, Adjusting Absolutism: First Amendment Protection for the Fringe, 80
B.U. L. REV. 907, 913 (2000) (arguing that a “qualified absolutist” approach to free speech doctrine
“incorporates safety valves that are ‘designed to release the pressures that inevitably destroy absolute
[First Amendment] absolutism’”) (quoting RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 24
(1992)); David L. Faigman, Reconciling Individual Rights and Government Interests: Madisonian
Principles Versus Supreme Court Practice, 78 VA. L. REV. 1521, 1557 (1992) (similar reading, also using
the term “safety valve,” of how the “tensions” created by absolutist First Amendment readings are eased
through supplemental doctrines). More generally, see Ashutosh Bhagwat, Hard Cases and the
(D)evolution of Constitutional Doctrine, 30 CONN. L. REV. 961, 961–62, 988–89 (1998) (arguing that
“concerns about hard cases have pushed the Supreme Court towards the inclusion of ‘outs,’ or ‘safety
valves,’ in all areas of constitutional doctrine”).
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it defined. Objections to the salute as “being too much like
Hitler’s” were raised by the Parent and Teachers
Association, the Boy and Girl Scouts, the Red Cross, and the
Federation of Women’s Clubs. Some modification appears
to have been made in deference to these objections, but no
concession was made to Jehovah’s Witnesses.44
We begin with this seemingly unremarkable passage from Justice
Jackson’s relatively brief statement of facts.45 Little noticed, and surely not
meant to be noticed beyond its stage-setting purposes, it nonetheless raises
two interesting points.
First, this passage indicates what Barnette might have been. It suggests
that, whether as a free speech matter or as a matter of free exercise of religion,
Barnette could have been decided on equality rather than liberty grounds.
Consider by way of comparison the Supreme Court’s pivotal decision
in Sherbert v. Verner.46 In that case, which laid the foundation for almost
three decades of constitutionally required and judicially administered
religious accommodations, the Court gave readers ammunition for either a
liberty-oriented or an equality-oriented reading of the opinion. On the one
hand, the Court said straightforwardly that a state-imposed burden—even an
indirect burden—on Sherbert’s exercise of religion demanded strict
scrutiny.47 Where an individual was forced to choose between “following the
precepts of her religion” and continuing to receive government benefits to
which she was otherwise entitled, such a choice would “effectively penalize
[] the free exercise of her constitutional liberties,” regardless of the state’s
intent or the effect of the benefits law on anyone else.48 On the other, the
Court called it “significant[]” that the South Carolina unemployment benefit
law created an exemption for objectors in instances where a “national
emergency” might require textile plants within the state to remain open on
Sundays.49 Justice Brennan added, “The unconstitutionality of the
disqualification of the Sabbatarian is thus compounded by the religious
discrimination which South Carolina’s general statutory scheme necessarily
effects.”50

44

W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 627–28 (1943).

45

See id. at 625–30.

46

374 U.S. 398 (1963).

47

See id. at 402–03.

48

Id. at 404, 406.

49

See id. at 406.

50

Id.
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The cases that followed suggest that the liberty reading of Sherbert did
have independent force.51 Nevertheless, the dual arguments in Sherbert led
to decades of debate about whether that case, or free exercise doctrine more
generally, is best understood as focused on equality and not liberty.52 After
the equally pivotal decision in Employment Division v. Smith,53 the Supreme
Court favored the equality reading of the Free Exercise Clause, treating it less
as a positive liberty than as an anti-discrimination provision.54 Between
statutory and judicial developments, we have swung some of the way back
toward a liberty-oriented approach and may swing further yet.55
We need not resolve the contest between these competing readings here.
I doubt we can “resolve” it anywhere. But that is irrelevant here. What
matters is to note the path not taken in Barnette. Given the unequal treatment
of the Witnesses’ objections, Justice Jackson could have decided the case on
equal-treatment grounds, whether as a matter of free speech or of free
exercise of religion. He could have given us Sherbert, or at least its equalityoriented aspect, twenty years earlier.
He did nothing of the sort. To the contrary, his opinion boldly marks out
a liberty of speech, silence, and belief, a “sphere of intellect and spirit which
it is the purpose of the First Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from
all official control.”56 Doing so made it not an easy or narrow decision, but
an immortal one. In taking a broad liberty-oriented approach, Jackson also
delivered an opinion that over time turned out to be “surprisingly difficult to
51 See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972) (applying strict scrutiny in a case
involving a generally applicable law with no apparent discriminatory exceptions); Thomas v. Review Bd.
of the Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 719 (1980) (same); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Expressive
Association and Government Subsidies, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1919, 1958–59 (2006) (noting the equality
reading of Sherbert but pointing out that “Sherbert itself didn’t limit its reasoning to such situations,” and
that the arguments for religious accommodation statutes “have generally treated Sherbert as being a
general religious liberty case, and not just a religious equality case”).
52

See generally CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER & LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND

THE CONSTITUTION (2007); Stephen Pepper, Conflicting Paradigms of Religious Freedom: Liberty Versus

Equality, 1993 BYU L. REV. 7 (1993).
53

Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 872 (1990).

See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531–32
(1993) (strict scrutiny applies where a law is not neutral and generally applicable, but instead
“discriminates against some or all religious beliefs or regulates or prohibits conduct because it is
undertaken for religious reasons”).
54

55 See, e.g., Volokh, supra note 51, at 1958–59 (noting the liberty focus of post-Smith religious
freedom “restoration” statutes); Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 139 S. Ct. 634, 637 (2019) (Alito, J.,
statement respecting denial of certiorari) (hinting at a willingness to re-examine Smith); Masterpiece
Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rts. Com’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1734 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (noting
that “Smith remains controversial in many quarters,” but emphasizing neutrality rather than liberty as a
key principle of free exercise).
56

below.

W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). I say more about this passage
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defend.”57 With his bold statement about the “fixed star in our constitutional
constellation,”58 Justice Jackson gave birth to both a fundamental
constitutional principle and 75 years of unresolved questions.
The second point about this passage is less doctrinal; it is more of a
sociological or historical observation about the making of constitutional law.
The school board’s “modifications” to the flag salute indicate that it was
willing to compromise with at least some of the objecting groups.59 Nothing
prevented the board from similarly compromising with or showing
“deference” to the Jehovah’s Witnesses,60 not just at the time the policy was
promulgated but at any point during the litigation.
It is this meeting of immovable forces and irresistible objects that makes
great law in First Amendment jurisprudence. This is simultaneously an
obvious point and one that deserves more attention than it generally receives.
The story of peaceful coexistence under conditions of pluralism is the story
of great First Amendment cases that do not happen. It is the story of local or
national governments treating dissenters and minority groups as a
fundamental part of the community and finding ways to compromise with
them. It is arguably a more important story than any that can be told about
the keystone cases and controversies in our First Amendment tradition.
Of course, there are always ultimate limits to compromise and coexistence. Under present conditions of polarization, and of sincere and
unyielding conviction, it may be a story that is harder to tell today, because
compromise and coexistence are harder to achieve. Or perhaps not. Perhaps,
now as then, these stories happen all the time and are simply not noticed or
given public prominence. In any event, the story of many great First
Amendment cases is just the opposite. It involves a local body, a state, or
even the national government refusing to compromise—sometimes more in
sorrow than in anger, and sometimes for reasons of politics, stubbornness, or
spite. It is often literally a footnote to the story told by the Court.61 Beyond
religious accommodation cases, it no doubt covers many great student speech
cases. In what may be a more complex way, it includes many modern public

57

Blasi & Shiffrin, supra note 19, at 121.

58

Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642.

In fairness, however, we might view the “modification[s]” less as a matter of willingness to
compromise, and more as a matter of a change in the general consensus over what physical form the flag
salute should take in light of the tainting and embarrassing effect of the likeness between the “stiff-arm”
flag salute and the Nazi salute.
59

60

Barnette, 319 U.S. at 628.

In Wisconsin v. Yoder, for instance, the Court noted in a footnote that the plaintiffs’ attorney
“wrote the State Superintendent of Public Instruction in an effort to explore the possibilities for a
compromise settlement” and was rebuffed. 406 U.S. 205, 208 n.3 (1972).
61
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accommodation cases and similar controversies.62 It certainly includes
Barnette.
The freedom asserted by these appellants does not bring
them into collision with rights asserted by any other
individual. It is such conflicts which most frequently require
intervention of the State to determine where the rights of one
end and those of another begin. But the refusal of these
persons to participate in the ceremony does not interfere with
or deny rights of others to do so. Nor is there any question in
this case that their behavior is peaceable and orderly. The
sole conflict is between authority and rights of the
individual.63
The facts in the majority opinion in Barnette are presented briefly and
without emphasis. By contrast, the “framing” of the legal issues in the
opinion constitutes much, even most, of the opinion. One key element of the
framing of the case appears in this passage. Like other passages in this close
reading, it is important both for what it says and for the questions it
necessarily raises about later cases, including recent controversies involving
religion and speech.
In contemporary terms, we might think of this statement as an assertion
that the conflict in Barnette does not raise any issues of second- or third-party
harm. Arguments of this sort have been raised most frequently in recent years
in the context of religious accommodations, under the label of “third-party
harms.” In brief, this argument asserts that “religious accommodations that
impose substantial or significant harms on identifiable third parties violate
the Establishment Clause.”64 Despite the serious questions raised by the thirdparty harm argument in the religious accommodation context,65 there are
reasons to think this argument has traction in the Establishment Clause
context. There, the problem is not necessarily the harm as such. Any
constitutional right is likely to affect, and make worse off, some other party

62 See, e.g., Paul Horwitz, The Hobby Lobby Moment, 128 HARV. L. REV. 154, 160–61 (2014)
(describing the history of the contraceptive mandate and of government willingness to compromise on the
initial scope of the mandate—up to a point); Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty and the Culture Wars,
2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 839, 877–80 (2014) (arguing that the contemporary culture wars have been
exacerbated by a mutual unwillingness to compromise).
63

Barnette, 319 U.S. at 630.

Marc O. DeGirolami, Virtue, Freedom, and the First Amendment, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1465, 1514 (2016). See id. at 1514–15 (summarizing and critiquing the argument and citing relevant
sources).
64

65 See, e.g., Marc O. DeGirolami, Free Exercise by Moonlight, 53 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 105, 130–
45 (2016).
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in a zero-sum pluralistic world.66 Rather, it is that the state’s imposition of
those costs on others arguably constitutes an official action preferring the
religion or religious needs of the person or group being accommodated over
the views and interests (religious or otherwise) of some other individual or
group.67
In free speech law, at least within expressive realms treated as falling
within the standard “boundaries” of the First Amendment,68 the Supreme
Court has been unreceptive to harm arguments of this sort. Indeed, in the
realm of speech it has been largely unreceptive to harm arguments altogether,
at least where the harm is dignitary or results from the subsequent actions of
a listener rather than resulting directly, immediately, tangibly, and
irremediably from the speech itself. There have certainly been cases in which
the Court has permitted speech restrictions on the basis of harm arguments.69
For the most part, however, the Court’s position has been that “any robust
free speech principle must protect at least some harmful speech despite the
harm it may cause.”70
That may change. It certainly seems to be changing in American legal
scholarship, which appears to be making the same shift toward advocacy of
harm-based limitations on free speech that it has made recently in the
religious accommodation context.71 This line of scholarship is much more
willing to consider balancing free speech claims against competing values
such as “equality, dignity, creativity, and public peace.”72 In a form of thirdparty harm argument, scholars operating in a “genre of egalitarian [First
Amendment] argument” are willing to contemplate judicial restriction of
speech where it may affect the “expressive interests of third parties,”
particularly where those third parties are more susceptible to the risk of being

66

See DeGirolami, supra note 64, at 1486.

For a recent symposium exploring arguments in favor of and against the third-party harm
argument in the Establishment Clause context, see Symposium, Religious Exemptions and Harms to
Others, 106 KY. L.J. 603 (2017-2018).
67

68 See generally Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary
Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765 (2004).
69 See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Harm(s) and the First Amendment, 2011 S. CT. REV. 81, 83 & n.12
(2012) (offering examples).
70 Id. at 81. To be clear, Schauer’s article argues more centrally that both public and judicial
rhetoric often downplay any potential harm resulting from speech or deny that speech causes harm at all.
71 That, at least, is the claim of Marc O. DeGirolami, who argues that there is a “vast and growing”
legal academic literature “advocating new free speech limits in the service of ostensibly common ends,”
including the protection of the dignitary interests of others and other protections against second- or thirdparty harm. See generally Marc O. DeGirolami, The Sickness Unto Death of the First Amendment, HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y (forthcoming), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3283041.
72

Alexander Tsesis, Balancing Free Speech, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1, 16 (2016).
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chilled or subordinated.73 While they concede that exporting a third-party
harm argument from the Establishment Clause to the Speech Clause would
conflict with current law, they are candid in questioning the current regime.
On this view, “we should be disturbed by the claim that individual rights,”
including speech rights, “can be exercised in ways that harm others.”74 One
might conclude as a result that where the exercise of speech “impose[s]
serious costs on others, including on those who are not well-positioned to
bear those costs or to resist their imposition,” we should “restrict the [speech]
and avoid imposing costs on third parties.”75
By framing the case as involving no “collision with rights asserted by
any other individual,” Barnette avoids all these questions. Doing so was not
inevitable or necessary. The Court regularly balanced First Amendment
claims against competing governmental interests, albeit in a way that
weighted the speech side of the scales heavily.76 Justice Jackson was no
stranger to this approach—including in cases involving the Jehovah’s
Witnesses.77
Of course, one might argue that balancing was irrelevant or unnecessary
in Barnette.78 Certainly the language here tilts things in that direction by
focusing only on the absence of any competing individual rights, rather than
contrasting the Witnesses’ rights with any competing interests, whether of
individuals or of the state. There are reasonable grounds for this. Allowing
the Witnesses to refrain from the flag salute did not, in the Court’s reading,
prevent others from engaging in it.
But cases both before Barnette, such as Gobitis, and after it suggest that
it was possible to take a different view of the interests involved in the case.
As in Gobitis, the majority could have given greater weight to the proposition
that the case presented “the conflicting claims of liberty and authority,”
73 Jeremy K. Kessler & David E. Pozen, The Search for an Egalitarian First Amendment, 118
COLUM. L. REV. 1953, 1994 (2018).
74 Micah Schwartzman, Nelson Tebbe, & Richard Schragger, The Costs of Conscience, 106 KY.
L.J. 781, 810 (2017-2018) (emphasis added).
75

Id. at 810.

76

See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1288–89

(2007).
77 See, e.g., Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 167, 178–80 (1943) (Jackson, J.,
concurring and dissenting) (discussing, in a case involving an aggressive proselytizing campaign by
Witnesses, the need to balance the speech and religious rights of the Witnesses with the rights of those
who objected to being subjected to the campaign).
78 In an interesting article, Iddo Porat notes the different approaches taken in different Jehovah’s
Witnesses cases during this period, including the deployment of balancing in some cases but not in
Barnette, and offers an analysis of why the Court adopted different approaches in these cases, including
its rejection of balancing in Barnette. See Iddo Porat, On the Jehovah’s Witnesses Cases, Balancing Tests,
and Three Kinds of Multicultural Claims, 1 L. & ETHICS HUM. RTS. 429 (2007).
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including a state interest in “safeguard[ing] the nation’s fellowship.”79
Although the case did not involve the invalidation of the flag salute
altogether, the Court could also have focused not on competing state
interests, but on the “personal interests on the other side” of the case—the
desire of the other students for a unified communal expression of allegiance
to purportedly common values.80
Justice Jackson is able to dismiss such concerns in part because of the
view that he takes of such exercises and their relation to national values and
unity. On this view, the keystone of public education is “secular instruction
and political neutrality.”81 Efforts to secure patriotism through exercises like
the flag salute “make an unflattering estimate of the appeal of our institutions
to free minds.”82 But that is not the only vision of liberal democracy available
to us. One might take a thicker view, believing that “government in a liberal
democracy not only may promote contested views of the good, but should do
so.”83
One might, of course, take this view while insisting that government
cannot do so through compelled speech. On that view, no matter how
important it may be for government to endorse thicker values than “political
neutrality,” the state still cannot take the additional step of conscripting an
individual to voice those values.84 Nevertheless, the stronger one’s vision of
the competing interests at play is, the more reason there may be to give real
weight to those interests, and thus to turn to something like balancing.
Jackson does none of this. Instead, he simply characterizes the case as
an uncomplicated question of individual rights, one that involves no
competing rights claims by other individuals and no competing government
interest worth taking seriously. He thus smooths the path toward his ultimate
conclusion. As with other elements of the opinion, in doing so he puts off
difficult questions that would return to bedevil the Court later, and to raise
doubts about just how seriously we can take his “fixed star” passage.85
Because he puts off those questions, it is certainly possible to read
Barnette as leaving open questions about third-party harm. But a more

79

Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 591 (1940).

80

Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 645 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943).

82

Id. at 641.
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Abner S. Greene, Government of the Good, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1, 2 (2000).

See, e.g., Abner S. Greene, “Not in My Name” Claims of Constitutional Right, 98 B.U. L. REV.
1475, 1526 (2018).
84

85 See, e.g., Smith, supra note 21; Richard W. Garnett, Can There Really Be “Free Speech” in
Public Schools?, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 45, 55 (2008) (noting that public schools are “charged with
forming and shaping students’ values, loyalties, commitments, and manners”).
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“musical” reading of Barnette, one that captures its sensibility and grand
sense and reads the language for all it is worth in light of that sensibility,
might suggest a different conclusion. A more “musical” reading of Barnette
suggests that, at least at the outset of its free speech jurisprudence, the Court
offered a vision of the centrality of free speech and speaker autonomy that
was more willing to protect speech despite the possibility of harm to others,
and perhaps especially intangible harms.86 That would suggest that more
expansive or aggressive contemporary arguments for third-party-harm-based
limitations—those involving free speech at a minimum, if not religious
exercise as well—are in tension with Barnette.
A second point worth noting about this passage is its emphasis on the
“peaceable and orderly” behavior of the objecting Witnesses. Of course,
those who know the history of violent behavior that followed the Court’s
decision in Gobitis are well aware that the actual violence came from the
Witnesses’ fellow students and neighbors, as well as public officials.87
Jackson makes clear that this behavior must not be laid at the objectors’ feet.
As Judge Tjoflat would put it years later, if the other students’ potential
reaction could be held against the Witnesses, this would “sacrifice freedom
upon the [altar] of order, and allow the scope of our liberty to be dictated by
the inclinations of the unlawful mob.”88
We might contrast this with some later treatments of student speech. Just
as I have suggested that Barnette is a great case that inspired 75 years of
doctrine that pays homage to Barnette while seeking to cabin and constrain
it, we could say much the same thing about the classic student speech case,
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District.89 There, the
Court held that student expressions of opinion must be protected unless the
school can show that the continuation of the speech “would materially and
substantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the
operation of the school.”90
Justin Driver, in his recent book on the history of the First Amendment
and public education, is surely right to warn that “[r]eports of Tinker’s demise

86 Cf. Erica Goldberg, Free Speech Consequentialism, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 687, 695, 721–25
(2016) (arguing for a consequentialist approach to free speech that allows for some balancing, while
protecting the core values of the First Amendment, by limiting the kinds of harm subject to judicial
balancing to conduct-like rather than “more intangible and emotional” harms).
87 See Blasi & Shiffrin, supra note 19, at 109–12 (noting the “widespread and severe” treatment
of Jehovah’s Witness schoolchildren and placing it in the wider context of violent attacks against adult
Witnesses).
88

Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1275 (11th Cir. 2004).

89

393 U.S. 503 (1969).

90

Id. at 509 (quotation and citation omitted).
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have . . . been greatly exaggerated.”91 Just as stories of compromise and
coexistence are less likely to achieve headlines than stories of conflict and
litigation, so stories about school administrators restraining the impulse to
suppress student speech are less likely to draw attention than stories of
censorship.92 That said, there is little doubt that subsequent cases have given
schools greater cover to suppress student speech without making a serious
showing of material or substantial interference with appropriate school
discipline.93
For purposes of the passage above, one important question that has
arisen in contemporary cases is the extent to which student speech can be
suppressed on the basis of whether the student audience, rather than the
student speaker, is reacting or likely to react in a “peaceable and orderly”
manner. By focusing on the Witnesses’ orderly behavior and protecting their
right to refuse to salute the flag, not just regardless of but doubtless because
of the violent reaction toward other Witnesses that the nation had witnessed
in the three years since Gobitis, Justice Jackson effectively refused to allow
those responses to constitute a heckler’s veto.
Some scholars have suggested that Tinker may be more ambiguous on
this question.94 But if applied vigorously and with due regard for its statement
that the Constitution requires us to risk the possibility that minority speech
may “start an argument or cause a disturbance,”95 Tinker is better read as
placing a heavy weight on the side of the scales of the student speaker, not
the objector. As with the Witnesses in Barnette and elsewhere, the
presumption should be that where students “threaten their classmates or an
outbreak of violence occurs, the students who are responsible for actually
causing those disruptions should be disciplined, not the speaker.”96
That is not what the courts have always done. To take a recent example,
in Dariano v. Morgan Hill Unified School District,97 the Ninth Circuit upheld
the action of a school principal directing students to turn shirts that
prominently featured the American flag inside out or to go home, because the
administration feared the students would face retaliatory violence. What
91

JUSTIN DRIVER, THE SCHOOLHOUSE GATE: PUBLIC EDUCATION, THE SUPREME COURT, AND
(2018).

THE BATTLE FOR THE AMERICAN MIND 125
92

See id. at 126.

See, e,g., Alexander Tsesis, Categorizing Student Speech, 102 MINN. L. REV. 1147, 1170–73
(2018); Mark Strasser, Tinker Remorse: On Threats, Boobies, Bullying, and Parodies, 15 FIRST AMEND.
L. REV. 1, 25–26 (2016) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s lack of clarity in post-Tinker cases about when
student speech can be punished “has resulted in differing and incompatible doctrines” in the lower courts).
93
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See id. at 8 n.49 (collecting commentary to this effect).
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Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969).
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Driver, supra note 91, at 128.
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767 F.3d 764 (9th Cir. 2014).
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counted was the prospect of substantial disruption, not the source of that
disruption.98 Dissenting from the denial of en banc review, Judge
O’Scannlain rightly worried that such an approach would “condon[e] the
suppression of free speech by some students because other students might
have reacted violently.”99
As with the third-party harm question, we need not settle here the
ultimate question what ought to happen to the law of student speech, or the
circumstances under which it may be restricted in order to achieve some
measure of security and allow public schools to do their job of educating
students. We could, again, read Barnette narrowly and technically,
distinguishing it from the school speech cases because the former involved
compelled speech and the latter involve punishment of individual speech.
But the tension between Barnette and modern student speech cases like
Dariano is greater than that. Compared to the arguable tension between
Barnette and later arguments for third-party-harm limitations or balancing in
the First Amendment, this tension is harder to avoid through narrow doctrinal
readings. Read for all it is worth, Barnette suggests that the value of speech,
and the individual autonomy that underlies it, is such that it should not be
swept aside because listeners might react negatively to it. That is especially
true so where the speaker, however provocative, is acting in a peaceable
fashion. In such a case, the negative or violent reaction of the listener turns
on social meaning and its impact on how objectionable the audience finds the
behavior or message of the dissenting students. Indeed, the record of behavior
after Gobitis involved a level of violence on and off school grounds that
extended far beyond the sort of violence that raised concerns on the part of
school officials in cases like Dariano. On this view, we are faced with a
genuine and ineluctable tension between Barnette and some modern student
speech decisions. We must thus either rethink those decisions, or rethink
Barnette itself.
A person gets from a symbol the meaning he puts into it, and
what is one man’s comfort and inspiration is another’s jest
and scorn.100
The passage here comes from the segment of Justice Jackson’s Barnette
opinion emphasizing that “[t]here is no doubt that, in connection with the
pledges, the flag salute is a form of utterance.”101 That is true even where the
expression in question is not linguistic but symbolic, using a physical object
98

See id. at 778.

99

Id. at 766 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc).

100

W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632–33 (1943).

101

Id. at 632.
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or ritual as “a short cut from mind to mind” that represents “some system,
idea, institution, or personality.”102
On a basic level, the passage quoted here is interesting as another
instance of pre-capitulation. Some 28 years later, in the “Fuck the Draft” case,
Cohen v. California,103 Justice Harlan wrote that the First Amendment must
care “not only [about] ideas capable of relatively precise, detached
explication, but [about] otherwise inexpressible emotions as well.”104 Even
where the expression involves “tumult, discord, and even offensive
utterance,” these are “matters of taste and style” that the Constitution leaves
“largely to the individual.”105 Harlan capped his point with his famous
observation that “one man’s vulgarity is another’s lyric.”106 Thus, this
passage in Barnette can be seen as Cohen avant la lettre.
More speculatively, we can also read this passage as making a larger
statement about how courts should treat symbolic speech and expressive
conduct. It does not seem to take the view that some message or symbolic
action, in order to be capable of First Amendment recognition as “speech,”
must be reducible to a clear formula, such as the ostensibly methodical
requirement that an action involve (1) “[a]n intent to convey a particularized
message” and (2) a “great” “likelihood” in the “surrounding circumstances”
that “the message [will] be understood by those who viewed it.”107 In
particular, it does not demand that the “meaning” of a symbol be the same
for the “speaker”—or, as in Barnette, the person compelled to articulate
government speech—and for the audience.108
Barnette does not settle the question of whose understanding of a
symbol counts. We might say that it concludes that the speaker’s
understanding counts, or at least that the fact that the compelled speaker
understands him or herself to be voicing a particular “meaning”—one that he
or she “puts into it”—is enough to raise compelled speech concerns. Or we
might read the passage as suggesting that, at least where there is “no doubt”
that “a form of utterance” is involved, everyone’s understanding counts, even
if different individuals and state actors may disagree about the
“particularized” meaning of that expression. What counts as expression, let
102

Id.
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403 U.S. 15 (1971).
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Id. at 26.
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Cf. Harold Anthony Lloyd, Crushing Animals and Crashing Funerals: The Semiotics of Free
Expression, 12 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 237, 256–57, 259 (2013) (discussing the distinction between
“intended expression” and “perceived expression” and the potential for the two to diverge in “subtle and
complex” ways, and arguing that “First Amendment protection should . . . apply to both.”).
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alone protected expression, is a difficult question that may cash out in
different ways in different contexts. It is unsurprising that Barnette does not
settle it, particularly given that no one doubted that the flag salute was
expressive and that it was precisely its expressive nature that led the state to
compel students to give it each morning.109
Still, we might draw two general—and, again, speculative—conclusions
from this passage. First, if we take the passage seriously, we should not turn
the notion of a “particularized” message that is likely to be understood by its
audience into a mechanical test.110 Where it is clear that a symbol is a symbol,
and that the state understands it as such, we should acknowledge that it may
give rise to a multitude of meanings, and protect that speech even if its
meaning is not understood identically by the speaker and the audience.
Second and more speculatively, this passage may again counsel against
the exportation of “third-party harm” arguments from religion to speech,
especially if those harms take a more dignitary and mediated form rather than
a tangible and immediate one. Justice Jackson’s language here, like the later
language in Cohen, suggests that speech that has symbolic meaning to the
speaker—or to the person resisting compelled speech—should be protected
even if an audience member may “put” a different “meaning” into the same
symbol, including an offensive and demeaning one. The music of Jackson’s
writing here seems disinclined to treat the prospect that others will be
offended by their understanding of a symbol as a reason not to protect the
speaker (or non-speaker) who finds a different message in the symbolic
communication or action.
Any credo of nationalism is likely to include what some
disapprove or to omit what others deem essential, and to give
off different overtones as it takes on different accents or
interpretations.111

109 For useful discussions about the general issue of what constitutes “speech” or expressive
conduct for First Amendment purposes, see, e.g., John Greenman, On Communication, 106 MICH. L. REV.
1337 (2008); James M. McGoldrick, Jr., Symbolic Speech: A Message From Mind to Mind, 61 OKLA. L.
REV. 1 (2008); Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, The First Amendment Structure for Speakers and Speech,
44 SETON HALL L. REV. 395 (2014); MARK V. TUSHNET, ALAN K. CHEN & JOSEPH BLOCHER, FREE
SPEECH BEYOND WORDS: THE SURPRISING REACH OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (2017).
110 This is something the courts have recognized, of course. In Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian
and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557 (1995), Justice Souter cautioned that “a narrow, succinctly
articulable message is not a condition of constitutional protection, which if confined to expressions
conveying a particularized message, would never reach the unquestionably shielded painting of Jackson
Pollock, music of Arnold Schöenberg, or Jabberwocky verse of Lewis Carroll.” Id. at 569 (quotation and
citations omitted). But Justice Souter’s warning against mechanical applications of the Spence test has not
always been honored by lower courts.
111

W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 634 (1943).

2019]

A Close Reading of Barnette

711

This passage once again shows how much of Barnette is devoted to
framing efforts. In particular, much of the opinion consists of efforts to
eliminate potential obstacles to Justice Jackson’s famed anti-orthodoxy
conclusion, by describing what the case is not or the questions on which it
does not turn. Thus, this passage follows Jackson’s observation that the
conclusion that the government cannot “order observance of ritual of this
nature does not depend on whether as a voluntary exercise we would think it
to be good, bad or merely innocuous.”112 The reason none of this matters is
that “[i]f official power exists to coerce acceptance of any patriotic creed,
what it shall contain cannot be decided by courts, but must be largely
discretionary with the ordaining authority, whose power to prescribe would
no doubt include power to amend.”113 Because there is no clearly fixed and
identifiable formula for the American creed, the question presented must be
whether the government has the power to compel the voicing by private
individuals of any creed, “independently of any idea we may have as to the
utility of the ceremony in question.”114
In that sense, the passage quoted above is unnecessary. Even if one
could imagine crafting a “credo of nationalism” that somehow managed to
omit nothing that is universally deemed essential and include nothing that
anyone would disapprove of, this Platonic form of a creed could just as easily
be superseded by one that would fulfill neither of these conditions.
In a footnote, Jackson goes further. Any statement of the American
creed, no matter how bland, banal, and widely shared, can take on different
meanings for members of the vast American audience, not least members of
our civic community who nevertheless dissent from that creed. The word
“Republic,” if meant to distinguish our system from a democracy, or the
words “one Nation” if meant to distinguish it from a “federation,” can “open
up old and bitter controversies in our political history.”115 The same is true of
a phrase—trite for some, powerful for others—like “liberty and justice for
all,” which “might to some seem an overstatement” given the injustice or
imperfection of the “present order.”116
Jackson’s footnote calls to mind a more momentous disagreement over
the meaning of the Constitution. The iconic abolitionist Frederick Douglass
came to treat the antebellum Constitution as worthy of loyalty and reverence
by reading it, in a spirit of ostensible textual rigidity and underlying
“visionary and redemptive constitutionalism,” as an anti-slavery
112
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document.117 In contrast, the abolitionist William Lloyd Garrison adopted a
perfectionist reading of the Constitution118 that led him to read the same
constitutional text as countenancing slavery and thus as a document worthy
only of rejection: a “covenant with death and an agreement with hell.”119
Their dispute illustrates and makes more powerful the point made more
mildly by Jackson. Every creedal statement or invocation of value can be the
subject of important, legitimate, and violent disagreement. To treat the
language in the Pledge of Allegiance—or, for that matter, in the Constitution
itself—as settled, clear, and unmistakable in meaning is an error, for multiple
reasons. At best, doing so treats this language as commanding consensus by
rendering it banal and meaningless, a matter of rote invocation and repetition.
It is likely that any such consensus would ultimately be either a lowestcommon-denominator form of consensus or the imperial “consensus” of an
elite establishment. At worst, attempts to treat our common creedal language
as uncontroversial become “jurispathic,” responding to different
interpretations and understandings of law, and of the legal and political order,
by asserting that “this [understanding] is law and destroy[ing] or try[ing] to
destroy the rest.”120 These jurispathic efforts are likely to fall hardest on
minority and dissenting communities.
Because Jackson’s observation that no creedal statement can avoid
multiple interpretations and reactions is so seemingly basic and uncontested,
it is unsurprising that this passage has received little attention. But it may be
worth revisiting in light of contemporary developments in constitutional
scholarship. As with so much in this close reading of Barnette, the arguments
I focus on here can be distinguished on various bases. But I suggest that this
passage raises serious questions about these developments.
Those developments take place next door to Barnette, as it were, in the
field of government speech. In the courts, the general rule is relatively clear
and firm. Apart from any limitations imposed by the Establishment Clause,
“[t]he Free Speech Clause restricts government regulation of private speech;

117 Ronald R. Garet, “Proclaim Liberty”, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 145, 154 (2000). See also J.M. Balkin
& Sanford Levinson, Interpreting Law and Music: Performance Notes on the “Banjo Serenader” and
“The Lying Crowd of Jews”, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 1513, 1558-60 (1999) (describing Douglass’s justiceseeking reading of the Constitution and comparing it to Dworkin’s argument for reading legal texts to
make them “the best they can be”) (quoting RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 313–14 (1986)).
118

See Robert M. Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 36 (1983).

J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Canons of Constitutional Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 963,
1015 (1998) (citing WALTER M. MERRILL, AGAINST WIND AND TIDE: A BIOGRAPHY OF WM. LLOYD
GARRISON 205 (1963)). For an illuminating discussion, see J.M. Balkin, Agreements With Hell and Other
Objects of Our Faith, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1703, 1708 (1997).
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it does not regulate government speech.”121 Government is “entitled to say
what it wishes” and “to select the views that it wants to express.”122 If a
government body or official wishes to select a set of creedal values or
propositions and proclaim them far and wide, it may do so, subject to the
same political risks that any government or governmental official incurs by
saying, or not saying, anything at all.
One may raise many questions about the nature and contours of
government speech doctrine. Many of them have to do with how clear it must
be that it is indeed government that is speaking, and with the line between
government speech and compelled individual speech. Recently, some
progressive constitutional scholars have gone a step further, asking whether
we can discern in the Constitution additional limits on what government can
say other than whatever limitations are required by the Establishment Clause.
They argue that the Constitution “imposes a broad principle of government
nonendorsement,” under which a number of constitutional provisions
positively “prohibit any [government] endorsement that abridges full and
equal citizenship in a free society.”123 Although this approach concededly
involves drawing difficult distinctions,124 it is not limitless: it specifically
limits government speech that undermines the Constitution’s
“[c]ommitments to full citizenship, equal citizenship, and the maintenance of
a free society,” all of which are “basic to American constitutionalism.”125
Various permutations of this claim are growing in visibility and popularity in
American constitutional scholarship.126
Jackson’s passage about the debatability of any given “credo of
nationalism” certainly does not dispose of this proposed doctrinal turn.
Among other things, one can distinguish the question what speech
government may (or must) engage in or avoid from the question whether
government can compel that speech from private individuals. One might
share Corey Brettschneider’s view that government “should not be neutral in
121
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See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf, Same-Sex Marriage, Second-Class-Citizenship, and Law’s Social
Meaning, 97 VA. L. REV. 1267, 1283 (2011); COREY BRETTSCHNEIDER, WHEN THE STATE SPEAKS,
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(2012); Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Chips Off Our Block?: A Reply to Berg,
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the values that it supports and expresses,” but must be neutral “in protecting
the right to express all viewpoints,” which may easily be extended to the right
not to express a viewpoint.127
But one may, I think, read this passage as raising doubts about a
government nonendorsement approach. Such an approach depends in large
measure on some level of agreement and certainty about two things: the
nature and meaning of the underlying “basic values that shape the principle
of government nonendorsement,” and the “social meaning” of a particular
government statement.128 Advocates of the government nonendorsement
approach readily, and wisely, concede that the latter category raises difficult
questions about how to determine social meaning.129
Their response, if I understand it correctly, is that 1) the question is no
more intractable here than it is with respect to the Establishment Clause, in
which the courts have muddled through with the endorsement test, which
asks exactly the same kinds of questions about social meaning;130 2) despite
any such difficulties, “there must be some constitutional limit to government
pronouncements” that disparage full and equal citizenship;131 and 3) the
government nonendorsement approach does not risk being applied to any and
every instance of government speech. There will be easy cases, and only
some government “messages will carry the kind of ‘charge or valence’ that
triggers constitutional concerns.”132
Although Jackson’s passage here is arguably distinguishable from the
case of government nonendorsement, it nevertheless eloquently raises doubts
about the viability of that approach. As Jackson observes, even the most banal
statement about what is “basic to American constitutionalism” is subject to
potential disagreement. And every claim that a government statement carries
a particular, and unconstitutional, social meaning likewise gives rise to
potential disagreement depending on “different accents or interpretations”—
on the fact that “[a] person gets from a symbol the meaning he puts into it,”133
and that good-faith disagreement about social meaning is inevitable in a large
population filled with people of diverse views and backgrounds. Easy cases,
if there are any, will likely take care of themselves. A congressional
127 Corey Brettschneider, Democratic Persuasion and Freedom of Speech: A Response to Four
Critics and Two Allies, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 1059, 1060 (2014).
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resolution declaring that “America is a white nation” will likely not occur,
or will be addressed swiftly and decisively by the political process if it does.
If neither of these predictions are true, it is unlikely that any “government
nonendorsement” rule will come close to addressing the deeper ailment.
That leaves the harder cases—the vast majority, arguably. And there,
live disagreement about what a creedal or political statement by government
means, both in itself and in its social meaning for particular individuals or
groups, is certain. If what ends up deciding such questions is some sort of
elite consensus, it is hard to see how either the Constitution or the democratic
health and legitimacy of the nation will be better off. Indeed, it is precisely
this kind of prospect that drove Robert Cover to worry about the “jurispathic”
role of judges and its effect on independent and dissentient communities
within our polity. Given the social position of the Jehovah’s Witnesses, it is
likely that some of the same concern was behind Jackson’s reminder that no
“credo of nationalism” will mean the same thing to every person.
In short, the lesson of this passage is that no value is so clear, and no
government expression of that value is so clear or widely shared, that it does
not leave room for good-faith disagreement about its meaning by loyal
citizens—including minority groups and including citizens, minority or
majority, who may have a different view about the meaning of words like
“equality” or “dignity” but nevertheless respect the rights of others in
practice. All this at least raises doubts about the wisdom and viability of any
approach that seeks to expand the set of words or statements that are
“unspeakable” by government.
It may be doubted that Mr. Lincoln would have thought that
the strength of government to maintain itself would be
impressively vindicated by our confirming power of the state
to expel a handful of children from school. Such
oversimplification, so handy in political debate, often lacks
the precision necessary to postulates of judicial reasoning. If
validly applied to this problem, the utterance would resolve
every issue of power in favor of those in authority and would
require us to override every liberty thought to weaken or
delay execution of their policies.134
This passage has received very little discussion. But it is arguably as
important as—and intimately connected to—the “fixed star” passage. One of
the key moves by Justice Jackson in Barnette, one that has been commented
on often enough not to require attention here, is his “re-conception of the
central constitutional issues at stake” in the flag salute issue from the
134
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religious-freedom-oriented focus of Gobitis to “one that implicated the
freedom of speech of all students,” including those with “moral or political
rather than religious” objections to compelled speech.135 Here and in an
earlier passage, Jackson accomplishes this in large measure by shifting the
subject from the objector to the state itself. Whether the objection turns on
religion or something else is less important than the question whether the
state has the power “to make the salute a legal duty” in the first place.136
In framing the issue this way, Jackson does more than mock the idea
that government’s survival depends on its ability to “expel a handful of
children from school,” although that is surely a rhetorical element here. And
he does more than make a strong statement about the importance of freedom
of speech, of religious exercise, or of individual autonomy and the
importance of being able to form one’s ideas independently. In this passage
at least, that is not his real focus. Rather, Jackson focuses on both the limits
of state power and, at least implicitly, the importance of other realms of
human activity. I have already noted that Barnette rejects the balancing
approach that the Court had taken in other cases. This passage helps us
understand why Jackson takes a more categorical approach. It suggests that
any claim of government exigency must have strong limits, lest the “power
. . . of those in authority” become an overwhelming reason in any case
involving individual freedom.
Nothing in this passage sneers at the flag salute as such. Nor is Jackson’s
concern limited to the flag salute. There is no shortage of important
government policies. They can take many forms: liberal, progressive,
conservative, libertarian, socialist, and so on; addressing military, economic,
social, and other concerns. And government officials can often reasonably
argue in such cases that some individual objector would “weaken or delay”
the execution of these important policies. Despite making sport at the idea
that such policies could turn on the expulsion of schoolchildren, Jackson
certainly does not deny the importance of government policy.
That is important. Something deeper is happening here than a mere
rejection of the sufficiency of the government’s asserted regulatory need in
the case at hand. Jackson rejects the very proposition that the fact that a policy
is legitimate and important necessarily means the courts should adopt a rule
that privileges, and exalts, the state, its power, and even its legitimate
interests. At least where some sphere of individual freedom is concerned, he
rejects the notion that this sphere must take a back seat to the exercise of state
power simply because the state can argue for the importance of a given
policy. In short, Barnette is not simply a statement about the value of

135

Blasi & Shiffrin, supra note 19, at 115.

136

Barnette, 319 U.S. at 635.

2019]

A Close Reading of Barnette

717

individual autonomy or freedom from compelled speech, although it is surely
that as well. In an important sense, it is also, and centrally, about the limits
of the state itself, and the danger of allowing the state to justify its actions on
the basis of arguments from necessity, the legitimacy of state policy, or the
value of government as such.
This reading naturally raises many questions. Just as the “fixed star”
passage has been questioned for years, on the basis that government
necessarily and routinely does state various orthodoxies,137 so the notion that
there are spheres of activity with which the state cannot interfere at all, no
matter how logical and pressing the argument that non-interference would
“weaken or delay [the] execution” of important government policies, has
been questioned, implicitly and explicitly, by both courts and scholars.
This criticism was apparent from the very day that Barnette was
decided. In their concurring opinion, Justices Black and Douglas, veterans of
the long war against Lochner, argued that the question in Barnette was not
one of government disability to interfere but of the state’s failure to meet even
the most minimal balancing test. The two Justices maintained that “[n]o wellordered society can leave to the individuals an absolute right to make final
decisions, unassailable by the state, as to everything they will or will not
do.”138 Nikolas Bowie observes that almost as soon as Barnette was decided,
it was clear that Justice Jackson’s absolutist position was “unworkable in
practice.”139 Thus began a long effort to “rein in” the ruling.140 As a later
Court would say, the First Amendment must not be interpreted “so as . . . to
cripple the regular work of the government.”141 Justice Jackson himself was
responsible for another famous apothegm on the subject, warning that the Bill
of Rights should not be “convert[ed] . . . into a suicide pact.”142 That language
is not necessarily inconsistent with his language in this passage. A clever
lawyer could reconcile the two statements on any number of grounds. But it
is unquestionably in tension with it. The music of each of these passages
comes from two very different scores.
Again, we can see that in setting out such a bold statement about the
limits of state power, Barnette naturally gives rise to questions that would
require decades of doctrinal fixes. In that sense, it does not so much “pre-
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capitulate” as make necessary the doctrinal journey of the 75 years that have
followed it.
Nevertheless, despite all that followed, and as a yardstick to measure
whether what ensued was faithful to Barnette or a rejection of it, it is worth
turning our attention away from the “fixed star” question and toward this
passage and its significance. Using Wesley Hohfeld’s taxonomy of rights, it
is now commonly observed that “an individual right to do or not do X” carries
a corresponding “government duty not to interfere with that right.”143 Most
discussions of Barnette focus less on the government side of the equation and
more on the individual right in question. That is understandable, since
identifying exactly what that right comprises, let alone attempting to find
“guidance as to its own limit,” is difficult enough.144 It is still more
understandable if the reader has been captivated by the “fixed star” passage
and paid less attention to other passages, like the one I have placed under the
close-reading microscope here.
But Barnette is not about the nature of the right at issue alone. For that
matter, on this reading it is not concerned primarily, if at all, with the contours
of any “government duty not to interfere” with whatever right is involved
here. Rather, as much of the language surrounding this passage suggests,145 a
central message of the case concerns the absence of any state power in this
area at all. For Jackson, whether the case involves religion or speech, and
how compelling the government’s asserted interests are, are less important
questions than whether the government has any power to impose certain
kinds of duties on unwilling individuals. The opinion is less about “the
securing of an individual right” and more about the absence or “negat[ion]”
of governmental power to act in particular spheres of human activity.146 No
balancing of rights against government interests is necessary. Nor is there
any need to treat this case as involving an exemption from the usual broad
reach of government power, and thus to decide the contours of an exemption
143 Linda C. McClain, Rights and Irresponsibility, 43 DUKE L.J. 989, 1040 (1994) (citing Wesley
N. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Legal Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 28–
30, 30–32 (1913)).
144
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qua exemption, and whether such exemptions should apply only to religious
individuals or to any conscientious objector. The state is “powerless to
impose [a flag salute] requirement on anyone, whether that person object[s]
to the flag salute or not.”147 It is not a limit on government power in particular
cases, subject to the usual formulae of balancing competing interests, but “a
‘no-power,’ a disability.”148 I return to this point below in connection with
the final passage discussed in this close reading.
As governmental pressure toward unity becomes greater, so
strife becomes more bitter as to whose unity it shall be.149
Another famous phrase in Jackson’s long string of apothegms, in
Barnette and elsewhere, is this one: “Compulsory unification of opinion
achieves only the unanimity of the graveyard.”150 But it is worth focusing on
the language that leads up to this conclusion. Jackson acknowledges that
“many good as well as … evil men” have sought to “coerce uniformity of
sentiment in support of some end thought essential to their time and
country.”151 But he argues that such efforts were doomed to “[u]ltimate
futility.”152 The more severe the effort to secure that unity, and the greater the
“governmental pressure” toward it, the “more bitter” the strife will become
as to “whose unity it shall be.”153
The arresting quality of language like “unanimity of the graveyard” is
such that one can easily subscribe to a statement like this without asking
whether it is necessarily true. That question has been asked repeatedly in
recent years, in a way that may not deal directly with compelled speech but

147 Jay S. Bybee, Common Ground: Justice Jackson, Antonin Scalia, and a Power Theory of the
First Amendment, 75 TUL. L. REV. 251, 280–81 (2000) (emphasis added). Bybee’s article is the only one
I have found that concentrates substantially on Barnette as a case about government power as such, not
the nature of the individual right at issue. He observes that this approach leaves open the very sorts of
questions that have preoccupied readers since Barnette was issued: questions about “the core meaning of
the freedoms of religion, speech and press,” and hence about what, precisely, government is forbidden to
do. Id. at 330–31. But he suggests that this is a natural consequence of a “power theory” reading of
Barnette and similar cases, which is “more of a theory about who is forbidden to interfere with religion,
speech, and press than a theory of what is forbidden.” Id. at 331.
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is certainly intimately tied to it and may include it. Against those who argue
that the contemporary culture wars, in both their political manifestation and
their legal application to such questions as the possibility of exemptions for
religious objectors to public accommodations laws in the context of LGBTQ
rights, require us to find ways of coexisting despite “our deep differences,”154
others argue that there is no need to do so. To the contrary, they assert that
“they have already won the culture wars, and that it is time to consolidate
their victory.”155
Perhaps the most notorious example of this is Mark Tushnet’s call—
issued before the 2016 election of President Donald Trump, with seeming
confidence that the election would usher in a Democratic victory—to
“abandon[]” a compromise-friendly “defensive crouch liberal
constitutionalism.”156 Tushnet asserted that the only question, following the
alleged liberal or progressive victory in the culture wars, is “how to deal with
the losers.” His own “tactical” judgment was that “taking a hard line . . . is
better than trying to accommodate the losers.” Such an approach might have
made sense when the war was ongoing, because “a hard line might have
stiffened the opposition in those fights. But the war’s over, and we won.”157
I raise this example here neither to praise nor to condemn it, nor to point
out the dangers of premature predictions. (Tushnet himself, in fairness, wrote
at the time that if Trump won the election, “all bets are off” and
“constitutional doctrine is going to be the least of our worries.”158) I doubt
that Tushnet is right about the state of the culture wars, or that the hard-line
strategy is indeed preferable, tactically or otherwise.159 It is certainly arguable
that time has not been kind to his assumptions about the state of the culture
wars. But the question whether it is better to press hard for a particular creedal
or normative vision or proposition—unity, equality, liberalism or
conservatism, or any other sort—or to stop short and compromise is just that:
a question, one that is subject to both empirical and normative inquiry. At
least on non-normative grounds, Tushnet’s answer should not be rejected

154 JOHN D. INAZU, CONFIDENT PLURALISM: SURVIVING AND THRIVING THROUGH DEEP
DIFFERENCE 6 (2016).
155 Paul Horwitz, Positive Pluralism Now, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 999, 1019 (2017) (reviewing Inazu,
supra note 154).
156 Mark Tushnet, Abandoning Defensive Crouch Liberal Constitutionalism, BALKINIZATION
(May 6, 2016, 1:15 PM), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2016/05/abandoning-defensive-crouch-liberal.html.
157

Id.

158

Id.

159

See Horwitz, supra note 155, at 1021–23.
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reflexively, any more than Jackson’s prediction of “the unanimity of the
graveyard” should be accepted uncritically.160
Rather, I bring it up because Tushnet’s confident assertion provides a
useful contrast to the passage quoted above. Jackson here is essentially
making an argument about the political economy of struggles over “unity” or
orthodoxy, and thus about the dynamics of culture wars.161 Where one creedal
view or value commands widespread consensus, and where those holding
that view include elites with access to governmental and cultural power,
holdouts or dissenters from that view—like the Jehovah’s Witnesses—are
likely to be seen as all the more disturbing. Where the creed or value is liberal
in nature, the holdouts will be seen as all the more illiberal. Their
unwillingness to accept the consensus will be seen as all the more impossible
to comprehend, and unworthy of any effort to understand empathetically.
Under these conditions, the majority’s (or elite’s) desire to close off the
remaining gap, no matter how small, and secure total agreement and
obedience may be even more urgently felt, and forcefully executed, than the
preceding, much longer and larger effort to achieve substantial consensus.
And that fierce last effort, one now backed by the force of legal sanction, may
result not in a final victory, but in the entrenchment and increasing
vehemence of the dissenting group. The effort to secure the final inch of
ground can “solidify, unify, and galvanize” the dissenting group in
“opposition to the state” which represents the prevailing view.162 Social
movements, combined with legal efforts, without doubt can do a tremendous
amount to change social and legal views and behavior and effect widespread
changes in and sharing of values—often, as Jackson suggests, values shared
by “good men” and women. But efforts to close the values gap completely—
to arrive at unanimity, and to compel conduct that reflects some widespread
and commendable value—can achieve the opposite result. They can push

160 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641 (1943). Indeed, such an answer is
consistent with Justice Holmes’s acknowledgment of the logic of “[p]ersecution for the expression of
opinions”: that if “you have no doubt of your premises or your power,” it is natural to “express your wishes
in law and to sweep away all opposition.” Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes,
J., dissenting). There is little, if any, intrinsic difference between doing so by criminalizing particular
statements and doing so by insisting that the individual positively endorse those premises, although there
may be tactical or instrumental reasons to do one and not the other. Holmes’s argument that we should
not do either, because “time has upset many fighting faiths” and “the ultimate good desired is better
reached by free trade in ideas,” is just a bet—“an experiment”—not a certainty. Id.
161 Cf. Horwitz, supra note 155, at 1023 (arguing that one reading of Trump’s victory, in light of
the liberal or progressive establishment victory in the culture wars that Tushnet assumes, is that “the urging
of a liberal ‘hard line’ and the rise of an anti-elite conservative populist movement [] are closely
connected,” forming part of a dynamic that encourages polarization and further conflict precisely because
each side views itself either as victorious or as embattled—or both at the same time).
162

Christopher C. Lund, Martyrdom and Religious Freedom, 50 CONN. L. REV. 959, 972 (2018).
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some of the dissenters to become more intensely attached to their views, more
insistent in refusing to comply, and more convinced that any state and society
that insists on their final surrender is not worthy of their loyalty and demands
forceful opposition.163 Differences of view will translate not just into
additional strife, but “bitter” strife.
It is this dynamic that Justice Jackson describes here far more pithily
than I have. One may conclude that the last inch of ground is worth gaining
at that price. The more unreasonable and illiberal the holdout group seems to
the majority, the more likely it is that this will be its conclusion. But one may
also surely question whether the last inch of ground is really worth the cost.
Changes in American values, at least among academics and other elites,
in the past 75 years may render this message less powerful than it once was.
The values that Jackson selects as examples may be less salient to a
contemporary audience. At least for the kind of reader who is likely to
encounter a judicial opinion or law review article, it is doubtful that values
like “nationalism,” patriotism, or anything instantiated in a ritual like saluting
the flag or mouthing the Pledge of Allegiance will seem worthy of “moderate
efforts” to persuade others to adopt them, let alone “ever-increasing
severity.”164
But other regnant values today may seem well worth precisely this kind
of escalating effort, including the use of legal coercion. It may not take the
form of the sort of compelled participation in a ritualized statement of values
that was directly at issue in Barnette.165 But it may well involve insisting that
individuals who choose to engage in public behavior, or to participate within

163 See Paul Horwitz, Against Martyrdom: A Liberal Argument for Accommodation of Religion,
91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1301, 1306, 1320–26 (2016).
164 Barnette, 319 U.S. at 640. Of course, one should not assume that this elite audience represents
anything like the majority view concerning American values or rituals.
165 In her contribution to this symposium, Erica Goldberg identifies a close analogy to this ritual:
the trend at public universities toward requiring the filing of “diversity statements” as part of the hiring or
promotion process. As she notes, there are many ways to incorporate such a policy that “may not be
constitutionally problematic” and that are substantially distinct from something like a “loyalty oath” or
compelled statement of values. A university may reasonably want to know what an applicant for
promotion has done to ensure that students from various backgrounds are benefiting from the classroom
experience, regardless of that teacher’s views on diversity or anything else, just as it may require that a
teacher applying for promotion show some other forms of teaching skill. I thus decline to make any blanket
statement about such policies as a constitutional matter. But neither is it hard to imagine versions of such
a requirement that are poorly designed, badly implemented, or employed in a way that insists not just on
practical plans and results but on the applicant’s formal assent to some particularized statement about the
meaning and importance of a contestable value or creed: a statement that “equality” or “diversity” have a
specific meaning and, as defined, are values to which the applicant subscribes unreservedly. At that point,
the fact that some might find that value preferable to something like patriotism is irrelevant, and the
requirement does indeed become highly similar to the flag salute requirement in Barnette. See Erica
Goldberg, “Good Orthodoxy” and the Legacy of Barnette, 13 FIU L. REV. 639, 651–57 (2019).
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the marketplace, engage in conduct, expressive or otherwise, that is
consistent with those values.166 Even commendable public values can furnish
the spark for the dynamic that Jackson insists leads to the “unanimity of the
graveyard.” This is the kind of dynamic that turns our so-called culture wars
into contests over the control of government, and the use of government in
turn to advance or entrench apparent victories in those culture wars. Both in
electoral politics and in the courts, our culture wars become a fiercer, more
bitter, increasingly polarized form of politics.
In sum, although Jackson’s ringing language about the “unanimity of
the graveyard” has about it the air of an article of faith, it is also a descriptive
account: a story about the ways in which contests over creeds and values can
become scorched-earth battles with significant costs. Barnette suggests one
limit: one cannot insist that the victory of one side, of one creed or value, be
memorialized by compelling the defeated side to literally give voice to its
submission. But this passage is suggestive of a deeper and broader meaning
than that. It has something to say about the dynamics and dangers of any
effort to move from widespread consensus to an entrenched and enforced
final victory.
***
I close with a final passage, which is important both in itself and for the
light it sheds on the “fixed star” paragraph that precedes it. Immediately after
his celebrated ode to the proposition that no official can prescribe or compel
orthodoxy “in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion,”167
Jackson offers the following conclusion:
We think the action of the local authorities in compelling the
flag salute and pledge transcends constitutional limitations
on their power and invades the sphere of intellect and spirit
which it is the purpose of the First Amendment to our
Constitution to reserve from all official control.168
Recall the discussion earlier of Barnette as a statement about the limits
of state power. There, I noted Jay Bybee’s observation that Barnette says
more about those limitations than about the precise contours of the right at

166 See id at 5–7 (examining modern public accommodations cases and arguing that, at least in
some instances, those cases may compel speech or expressive conduct that is “constitutionally suspect”
and raises the same concerns that drove Justice Jackson’s opinion in Barnette: “an aversion to mandated
uniformity of opinion, or even simply a show of uniformity of opinion, and the political strife that may
ensue”).
167

Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642.

168

Id.
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issue in Barnette.169 Jackson’s peroration—his real peroration, after the
“fixed star” passage that usually marks the end of most readers’ encounter
with Barnette—sheds some possible light on the question what sort of
limitation on state power Barnette ultimately involves. I cannot do even
partial justice here to the multitude of readings of the right in Barnette that
various scholars have offered. Rather, I focus on one opposed pair of
readings, both offered in Steven D. Smith’s contribution to this
symposium.170
Smith usefully frames Barnette as a response to a “fundamental
question” of modern governance: “How, or on what sort of principles, can a
political community—or a common life together—be maintained under
conditions of deep and persistent pluralism?”171 Justice Jackson’s opinion in
Barnette constitutes “the American contribution to the challenge of
pluralism.”172 Smith suggests that Barnette’s “fixed star” passage provides
two possible answers, each in tension with the other.
One answer focuses on “neutrality.” The Constitution requires our
government to remain “agnostic” or “neutral” on questions about which other
governments would have positively asserted an official orthodoxy; instead, it
must maintain a “stance of steadfast neutrality.”173 The other answer focuses
on “integrity.” On this reading, government is free—or generally free; many
of us would read the Establishment Clause as imposing some limitations on
this freedom—to offer various pronouncements that constitute an orthodoxy
or “officially preferred ‘right position.’”174 What it cannot do is “compel
citizens to affirm such opinions.”175 Our Constitution establishes a
“committedly non-confessional state,” in which government must “respect
and protect the integrity and freedom of its citizens,” not least by being barred
from “forc[ing] [citizens] to suffer the most direct and severe impairment of
their integrity—namely, being compelled to affirm things they do not
believe.”176
Smith prefers the second reading. But he asserts that the question “can
hardly be settled just by reading Barnette—among other reasons because

169 See Bybee, supra note 147, at 331 (Jackson’s Barnette opinion is “more of a theory about who
is forbidden to interfere with religion, speech, and press than a theory of what is forbidden.”).
170 See Steven D. Smith, “Fixed Star” or Twin Star?: The Ambiguity of Barnette, 13 FIU L. REV.
801 (2019).
171

Id. at 803–04.
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Id. at 804.
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both interpretations can find support there.”177 And that is especially true if,
as he does, one focuses “only [on] the revered sentence from Barnette,” the
“fixed star” passage, with its complex mix of prepositions and its
combination of “no orthodoxy” and “no compulsion” language.178
“Neutrality” and “integrity” are capacious categories, which can no
doubt be treated as covering a number of different readings of Barnette under
each rubric. I do not attempt to narrow down what is meant in each case. But
I would suggest that, even if one limits oneself to reading Barnette alone, the
passage quoted above tilts the scales in favor of an integrity-based reading of
that opinion rather than a neutrality-based reading.
The passage’s concern is not with what the state can or cannot say. To
be sure, it refers to “constitutional limitations” on state power, which could
be read in isolation as a reference to limitations on state pronouncements of
orthodoxy. But the sounder reading, I think, is that the limitations in question
refer to the protected “sphere of intellect and spirit” which must remain
outside “all official control.” Read together, the “fixed star” passage and the
reference to a protected sphere of intellect and spirit are far more suggestive
of an integrity-based reading than one focused on the absence of state
orthodoxy.
The combination of an integrity reading with the Court’s emphasis on
the limitations on state power may in turn shed additional light on the
integrity reading of the right recognized in Barnette. It suggests that the
respect for individual integrity recognized in Barnette is more than
instrumental and goes beyond a highly specific conception of human
personhood. It could be true that forced recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance
“may have an influence on what and how one thinks,”179 although it also
seems possible that such performances will be so rote in nature as to have
little influence at all. Similarly, it may be true that compelled speech shows
little “recognition of and respect for the value of sincerity,”180 although a
good deal of useful democratic discourse may involve valuable qualities
other than sincerity, such as irony, “humor, pretense, sarcasm, and
exaggeration.”181 But Barnette does not rest on a particular conception of
what the individual ought to do with his or her integrity. It simply removes
177

Id. at 812.

178

Id.

Seana Valentine Shiffrin, What is Really Wrong with Compelled Association?, 99 NW. U. L.
REV. 839, 855 (2005).
179
180

Id. at 860.

Id. at 863. Shiffrin, to be clear, recognizes this, noting that even if “a general virtue of sincerity
is integral to a successful First Amendment culture,” public discourse need not be conducted at a constant
level of high-minded earnestness. Id. I confess that I emphasize this point because, as an immigrant to the
United States from a Commonwealth country, I tend to think that there is plenty of sincerity, passion, and
earnestness in American public discourse and far too little genuine irony and wit.
181

726

FIU Law Review

[Vol. 13:689

the question from the scope of state power altogether, at least where the state
would purport to direct the individual to speak.
Perhaps what matters about the Barnette opinion is not the precise
theory of human dignity, integrity, autonomy, or what have you that Justice
Jackson has in mind, although this is the question that has occupied most
readers of the opinion. Nor is it the opinion’s emphasis on the limits of state
power. It is how the two work together. Poetic judicial language cannot be
read literally, to be sure. But the conclusion that governmental authority
ceases—not that it exists but fails a balancing test in a particular case, but
that it runs out altogether—when it confronts the “sphere of intellect and
spirit” is worth more attention. It offers a vision of both individual freedom
and the public sphere that recognizes that other areas of human life exist, that
they matter as much as government’s ability to “maintain itself” or execute
even commendable policies,182 and that their existence and independence do
not depend on the state’s sufferance.
In that sense, Barnette recognizes for the individual mind what others
have argued is true for larger institutions: that, as Richard Garnett has written,
“constitutionalism relies . . . not only on the separation and limitation of the
powers of the political authority, but also on the existence and the health of
authorities and associations outside, and meaningfully independent of, that
political authority.”183 It reminds us, in a time when it is easy to think of the
state as the locus of all power and the source of every right, of what Mark
DeWolfe Howe took for granted about individuals when he made the same
argument for groups:
[G]overment must recognize that it is not the sole possessor
of sovereignty, and that private groups within the
community are entitled to lead their own lives and exercise
within their area of competence an authority so effective as
to justify labeling it a sovereign authority. To make this
assertion is to suggest that private groups have liberties
similar to those of individuals and that those liberties, as
such, are to be secured by law from government
infringement.184
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W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 636 (1943).

Richard W. Garnett, “The Freedom of the Church”: (Towards) An Exposition, Translation,
and Defense, 21 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 33, 39 (2013).
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184 Mark DeWolfe Howe, Foreword: Political Theory and the Nature of Liberty, 67 HARV. L.
REV. 91, 91 (1953).
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III. CONCLUSION
I have closed with a grand, if not grandiose, suggestion. Among the
significant aspects that one can draw from a close reading of Justice
Jackson’s opinion in Barnette are its recognition of the limits on state power
and rejection of balancing, its emphasis on the integrity and independence of
the individual, and its particular application of these two positions to protect
the right to reject a compelled orthodoxy, “good” or “bad.” Taken together,
they suggest that Barnette is a kind of paean to the sovereignty of the mind—
in a legal sense, a political sense, and perhaps a larger sense altogether.
That is a rather sweeping vision. It raises difficult practical and
jurisprudential questions that the opinion itself certainly does not answer.
However eloquent Jackson’s opinion is, and however fitting the outcome, it
is hardly surprising, given the reading I have suggested here, that much of
the history of post-Barnette First Amendment law has consisted of conscious
or unconscious efforts to rein it in. In the 75 years since Barnette, an ever
more labyrinthine set of doctrines has provided more instruction—and more
constraints—than the decision itself did. The reach of the First Amendment
itself has expanded considerably since 1943. But so has the Supreme Court’s
reluctance to speak in terms of the absence of state power and the absolute
sovereignty of the individual mind. Instead, it speaks in terms of competing
governmental interests. They may receive a form of scrutiny that is so strict
in some areas as to be “fatal in fact,”185 but they are entitled to scrutiny just
the same. In other words, just as the First Amendment has become a more
powerful restraint on government, so the presumption that government has
the jurisdiction to regulate in the first place, subject only to whatever test the
Supreme Court imposes, has become more powerful as well.
That Barnette rejects this kind of language, and speaks in such absolute
terms about the lack of any state power to compel individual obeisance to
orthodoxy, makes it understandable that so much doctrine since then—in the
areas of compelled speech, government speech, and much else in the First
Amendment—has both followed from and reined in Barnette. And it may
suggest something about why, as I noted at the outset of this article, there has
been relatively little direct discussion of Barnette in recent scholarship on
what Erica Goldberg calls the modern “good orthodoxy” cases, even as the
Court has begun invoking Barnette in precisely those cases.186 Barnette can
surely be distinguished from these cases. But it does certainly not sit
comfortably with them.

185 Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for
a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 4 (1972).
186

See Goldberg, supra note 165.
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That there is a tension does not make Barnette right or the new wave of
arguments wrong. But this tension ought to be addressed squarely and
openly. Barnette deserves and demands more readers.

